Criticism of William James and "The Will to Believe"

In his “The Will to Believe,” William James calls William Clifford's position that it is wrong to form a belief on insufficient evidence “irrational.” For James, some beliefs should be held because holding them creates the conditions needed to find truth, and that holding no belief is just as “passional” as holding one. In this paper, I will explain the views of both Clifford and James. I will also criticize James' view that some beliefs should be held on faith alone and defend Clifford from James' attack.

Clifford's goal is to criticize beliefs held with insufficient evidence as being in fact immoral. He begins his task with the story of the shipowner about to send a ship to sea. The ship is old and not particularly well-built, but has undertaken many trips. Lately, some have suggested to the owner that the ship might not be seaworthy, and that this next trip to sea could be its last. The owner puts these doubts out of mind, trusting that God would not allow a ship full of people to sink. He watches the ship's departure from port “with a light heart,” believing that the ship will be fine. The ship later sinks.

The shipowner, Clifford argues, is morally culpable for the disaster. By allowing his faith in the safety of the ship to take the place of actual evidence, the shipowner caused the accident. But even if the ship were not to have sunk, the shipowner would still be morally wrong in believing that the ship was safe, Clifford argues. The shipowner's faith led him to ignore warnings that the ship was unseaworthy, biasing his beliefs and causing him to be dishonest in his reasons. And, no man's beliefs are are “in any case a private matter which concerns himself alone.” The shipowner's unfounded belief in the seaworthiness of his ship affects the beliefs of his peers, with similarly possible disastrous consequences. Thus, holding beliefs on insufficient evidence is wrong because of the consequences it may have for others through your own actions, because being dishonest is a moral failing, and because of the affect it has on the beliefs of others and their own actions.

James begins his response to Clifford defining three types of properties that a hypothesis has. First, hypotheses are either living or dead; living hypothesis are options which are available to an individual. The option of being either an atheist or a Christian is a real option for Westerners due to cultural factors, but the options of accepting the Norse pantheon or believing in Zeus are not living options for us anymore. Second, hypotheses have the property of being either forced or not. Forced hypotheses are hypotheses where a choice must be made. Finally, momentous hypotheses are hypotheses that one only has the chance to accept once, versus trivial hypotheses that can be accepted at many different times in one's life. Genuine options are hypotheses that are living, forced, and momentous. James argues that when a genuine option cannot be decided on the basis of evidence, then we must choose on our faith alone.

This is contra to Clifford's principle that a belief must not be held without sufficient evidence. According to James we should not be afraid of error, but instead be seeking the truth. The slavish adherence to Clifford's principle, in James's view, precludes the principles necessary to find truth. The genuine option of God cannot be decided on the basis of evidence; faith must be held that God exists, and this faith in God creates the conditions necessary to find God's truth. Holding the belief that God exists is the only way to find truth, since God will only reward those who believe in His existence. James gives other examples of times when a belief must be formed without evidence in order for it to be realized as truth, where “faith can help create a fact.” In matters of the heart, for example, belief that a person shares your feelings is important to move forward in a relationship. The passengers of a hijacked plane (to update James' original example) must believe that they can overtake the hijackers before attempting to do so. Or, the scientist must hold her hypothesis on faith so that she can eventually verify or falsify the hypothesis.

I believe that James is mistaken that his types of examples show that faith can make a fact. To me, his examples are not cases where believing causes a fact to come into reality, but are cases where there is a well-founded belief that a particular process can help discover the truth. The lover does not have faith that she loves him back, but has a belief based on evidence that by pursuing the girl he may discover she loves him. The passengers do not necessarily have faith that they can overpower the hijackers, but a belief based on past evidence that groups of individuals can in principle be strong enough to thwart the hijackers. And, the scientist does not hold her hypothesis by faith alone until it is tested, but instead holds a belief that the scientific method can decide whether or not the hypothesis is false. Clifford's principle that one should not believe unless one has sufficient evidence holds for these examples. Any of these individuals would tell you that it would be silly to believe that she liked you without any evidence, that it would be dangerous and unproductive to believe in your ability to overpower your attackers without sufficient evidence, and that it would be soundly unscientific to accept your hypothesis without verification.

However, the three examples above are only about “finite,” earthly matters and not about God. Can a belief in God help one learn the truth about God? I will reluctantly concede to James: yes, if God exists, then belief in Him will allow one to discover the truth. But, the forced choice one makes regarding whether to believe in God is no more than a guess based on a few options resulting from happenstance. If we assume that one religious truth is incompatible with other religious truths – for example, that God is incompatible with Zeus – and that some religious truth exists, then it follows that there is only one religious truth. But, the genuine religious options available to us are limited because of our birth – we cannot choose our parents. We must choose a religious belief using no evidence based on the finite options available to us from a potentially infinite pool. The odds of having the right domain of options available and making the right choice are exceedingly low. This is not a method of truth-seeking, but merely high-stakes guessing.

Clifford promises us only true beliefs while James offers us potential verification (but only after we are dead). As exemplified by the shipowner, the cost of a mistaken belief can be great, so therefore it is in the best interests of everyone if the incidence of mistaken beliefs is reduced. James believes that withholding beliefs in the lack of evidence is not useful, and so a belief can be held on faith alone in order to pursue the truth. However, I have disputed this, analyzing his examples as not as exemplars of faith, but as ordinary examples where individuals held beliefs based overwhelming evidence from past experience. James fails to convince me that there are cases where faith should be maintained, leaving Clifford the standard to which we should model our belief forming processes.

The Universe and Conceivability

Thinking about the cosmological argument for God's existence in class the other day, I found myself wandering down a path of criticism that none of my other classmates seemed to notice. While I'm aware of arguments stating that the universe might be necessary and not contingent -- that it is not possible for it to have not existed -- I was toying around with a conceivability argument for the necessity of the universe.

Perhaps it is a failure of imagination on my part, but I find it inconceivable for the universe to not exist. While it is conceivable that any particular object in the universe could not exist -- the beer bottles on my desk, the Milky Way galaxy, and so on -- I cannot literally imagine what it means for the universe to not exist. For me, any notion of inexistence contains a relation to something else that exists. If the beer bottles on my desk were to not exist, my desk continues right along. If the Milky Way were to not exist, there's still a bunch of stuff out there. And even if every atom in the universe were to not exist, the universe itself continues to exist. But, if the universe doesn't exist, in relation to what, exactly, is it not existing?

There are two possibilities. The first is that it is necessary, in which case there isn't a requirement for some divine first cause. The second is that it is contingent, in which case there is some second-order universe in which our universe can not exist. And as for the second-order universe, it is either necessary or contingent. If all these universes are contingent, then the premise of the cosmological argument stating that all contingent things need a necessary thing for their existence is shown to be false and the argument fails.

This isn't particularly well thought-out at the moment, but I'm interested in any arguments known that are related to this line of reasoning.

Question

Why doesn't Safari 4 Beta (and Safari 3) let me type an open parenthesis -- '(' -- into the search field on my Google homepage?

Where I Stand

I applied to graduate schools this year, and so far it's not all that promising for doctoral programs. My picks all rejected me except for one of my top picks, where I was put on their waiting list. This was always a very real possibility, considering I come from a school with little academic recognition and majored in a field outside of the field to which I am applying, but it is still a little disheartening.

Upon the advice of a faculty member in the department where I am on the waiting list, I've applied to some MA programs as well. Completing a Master's should give me experience in the field, which will be essential should I want to reapply for doctoral programs in a couple years. I am more confident about my chances of getting in to a MA program, but the drawback is that Master's programs are not as well-funded as PhD programs.

A second option that I've begun to consider is remaining at Central Michigan for another year or two, to complete a second Bachelor's in a related field. I'm about a third of the way through a mathematics major, as well as with a philosophy major, so completing either of these would be do-able in a couple years. I could also complete the computer science-mathematics major in that amount of time, which I feel has the potential of helping my application a lot.

I suppose I could try finding a job, too. But that wouldn't be any fun.

Philosophical Lexicon

I discovered the Philosophical Lexicon a couple days ago, a dictionary of joke philosophical terms mostly made from the names of famous philosophers. Most of them go right over my head, but there's a few that I thought were pretty funny. A sampling (naturally, of the ones I understand):

outsmart, v. To embrace the conclusion of one's opponent's reductio ad absurdum argument. "They thought they had me, but I outsmarted them. I agreed that it was sometimes just to hang an innocent man."

nagel, v. To sense, vaguely, that something crucial but ineffable has been left out of account. "No sooner had I completed my proof that the robot was conscious than I was beset by a swarm of nageling doubts."

hempel, adj. (only in the idiom hempel-minded) Said of one who insists on recasting the problem in the first order logic.

levi strauss, (trade mark) Manufacturer of coveralls to which symbols, emblems and patches are usually applied. Originally levi strauss products were working hypotheses, then in the nineteen-sixties flaunting them in conventional settings acquired political significance. They are now accepted almost everywhere.

I'm Stuck.

I'm taking a trip via Amtrak out to Arizona in a little over a month, but I have no idea which lenses I want to take with me. I'd like to keep my travel kit small and light, or have only one big and heavy lens. I have about $200 I can spend on used equipment, but I'm not sure I need to invest in any more equipment. So, my kit choices, as I see them right now:

• Tamron 19-35mm f/3.5-4.5


• Minolta 50mm f/1.7


• Minolta 35-70mm f/4

Pros: Fairly light, since the 50/1.7 and the 35-70/4 are small. The 50 is fast, which will be great for those dark train stops at night. The 35-70 is a cool little lens, with sharp optics and great color.
Cons: Limited range. I'm forfeiting a lot of length. The macro on the 35-70 is only 1:4. I'd have to purchase the 35-70, since I broke my copy earlier in the fall.

• Tamron 19-35mm f/3.5-4.5


• Minolta 24-85mm f/3.5-4.5

Pros: Tiny kit, and the 24-85 is fun to use with great color and sharpness. I gain a little range as well.
Cons: A little heavy, and I sacrifice some speed that I gain with the 50/1.7.

• Sigma 24-135mm f/2.8-4.5 D or Tokina 24-200 f/3.5-5.6 AT-X


• Minolta 50mm f/1.7

Pros: I gain the speed of the 50, plus more range on the telephoto end with the Sigma/Tokina.
Cons: I would have to buy the Sigma/Tokina, blowing the money I have budgeted, and I lose the wide end.

Any suggestions out there?

Update: I just bought the Minolta 35-70mm f/4 used on eBay for $50. Looks like I'm going with kit #1!

I Want One

Hell yeah.

"Let us do no such damn thing!"

Philosophers

I can't remember where I found this, but I thought it was pretty funny:

xkcd

I've been trying to give xkcd the benefit of the doubt lately. It's been going downhill -- for me, at least -- since the spring, but this comic takes the cake. Among all the bad chart comics, the bad meme comics, the bad relationship comics, and all the other bad comics, I've been holding out some triweekly hope that maybe he might pick it up again and deliver the funny. I think this one is it, though, the comic that makes it finally official.

xkcd isn't funny.